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1  Taxing Capital Income
All EU countries, at least conceptually, tax private capital income according to the residence
principle. If perfectly enforced, the residence principle has several favorable features. For
once, it ensures capital export neutrality even if tax rates on capital income differ across
countries. That is, taxes do not distort an investor’s decision of where to invest his or her
savings. This can be shown to lead to a maximum of global pre-tax income. A second and
closely related feature of the residence principle is that it separates national decisions on the
size of tax rates on capital. Under the residence principle, a country that increases its tax rate
on personal capital income does not have to fear that foreigners withdraw their savings, nor
will national investors send their savings abroad, as such a move would not alter the tax rate
faced by domestic or foreign investors.
1 
The Achilles heel of the residence principle however is enforceability. Without
international cooperation, it is very hard to tell how much capital income domestic investors
receive from foreign sources. Therefore, the European plans to limit bank secrecy laws and to
foster international information exchange between authorities can be interpreted as an effort to
improve the enforcement of the residence principle. In the light of the above virtues of this
principle this can be seen as a measure to increase national governments’ independence in
taxation issues.
2 Note that even the alternative measure of a withholding tax on cross border
income (also discussed in the EU), while contradicting the idea of pure residence taxation,
may lead to similar results. This is because it increases investors’ incentives to claim a foreign
tax credit (which usually is granted in tax systems that follow the residence principle) and
thereby raises their willingness to report foreign income. 
                                                
1 A caveat applies if investors themselves face low costs to move abroad. At least with language and cultural
barriers still in place this may not be of immediate concern. 
2 For decades, the UK has argued against coordination in Europe and in favor of tax competition hoping this will
result in low taxes on capital. If co-ordination is restricted to the coordinated application and enforcement of the
residence principle, however, nothing prevents a single country (the UK) from lowering its tax rate. 2
While the application of the residence principle is conceivable for private households,
it is not very realistic for incorporated firms. More or less all international double-taxation
agreements grant an unlimited right to the host country of foreign corporations to subject these
corporations to the national corporate income tax (as long as taxation is not discriminatory).
As a result, this implements the source principle of taxation for corporations. While it is true
that the home country of a corporation may additionally tax repatriated profits and use a tax
credit system similar to those applied to private foreign income, there is a fundamental
difference. In the case of a corporation foreign profits stay untaxed in the home (residence)
country of the corporation until repatriation. This possible deferral of home country taxes
makes source taxes much more important for corporations than for private, truly reporting
households who lack the possibility of deferral. 
A major question that appears in this context is whether enforcing the residence
principle for private investment income is enough to safeguard the viability of capital
taxation. It is well conceivable that, on the one hand, European and international co-operation
in tax matters enforces the residence principle of taxation for households but, on the other
hand, continued corporate tax competition significantly decreases the tax rate faced by
corporations. In such a situation, how much of a difference in private and corporate tax rates
on capital is realistic? Can an asymmetric approach towards private and corporate income be
sustained? Or is a high tax on private capital income bound to fail if the corporate income tax,
which performs an important withholding function for the income tax,
3 is lowered in the
process of tax competition. 
The above questions motivate the present paper. In particular, we want to shed some
light on the question of what effects a larger gap between personal and corporate income taxes
would have on private behavior. We are hoping that the answer to these questions will
improve our understanding of how rewarding the enforcement of the residence principle for
                                                
3 See e.g. Mintz (1995).3
private savings would be, given that there is no effort (nor any success) to limit the downward
trend in corporate tax rates. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the tax incentives for and against
savings through a corporate firm instead of saving privately. Section 3 sets up a simple model
that forms the basis of our empirical estimates. Against the background of the theoretical
model, section 4 considers the optimal national tax policy that is confronted with the stylized
facts in section 5. Section 6 presents our empirical results. Section 7 concludes. 
2  The Advantage of the Corporate Shelter
When different types of income are subject to different tax rates, tax payers will have an
incentive to declare one additional Euro of income in a low taxed basket if this saves them
from having to declare one Euro of income in a high taxed basket. In the literature, this
problem of income shifting has been discussed extensively with respect to multinational
corporations. Internationally operating firms may use transfer prices or adjust their financial
structure in order to shift income from high tax countries to low tax countries (see, e.g.
Weichenrieder (1995) or Keen (1993)) and there is quite some evidence that they actually do
so (Altshuler and Grubert (2000)). 
There is a smaller but growing literature on income shifting within countries, between
the personal and the corporate income tax bases. One problem of having a low corporate
income tax rate but high personal income taxes arises as managers have an incentive to re-
label labor income as capital income, effectively reducing their tax on salaries. This problem
has been analyzed by Gordon and MacKie-Mason
4 and has received extensive consideration
in connection with Nordic dual income tax systems.
5 Gordon and Slemrod (1998) provide an
empirical study of income shifting between labor income and corporate profits for the U.S.
                                                
4 Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) argue that for this reason it may be even in the interest of a small country to
employ a positive corporate tax rate. 
5 See e.g. Cnossen (1999).4
They show that differences between the personal and the corporate tax rates have a significant
impact on reported labor income and corporate rates of return. 
The present paper highlights another effect of differences in personal and corporate tax
rates: the increased incentives for private investors to use the corporate shelter to save their
capital income from high personal taxes. Figure 1 illustrates this effect. Assume a fixed
interest rate r and personal and corporate tax rates at a rate t and τ, respectively. For t > τ, any
initially invested Euro will grow at a higher growth rate if invested within the corporation than
when invested in the personal sphere:  ) 1 ( τ − r  >  ) 1 ( t r − . Growth path a associated to the
corporate investment is clearly steeper than growth path c associated to the private investment
and total assets W accumulated will accordingly be higher. 
Figure 1: Outgrowing the high-tax Investment
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Note however, that, while private post-tax revenues are ready for consumption after selling
the bonds, distributing corporate profits to shareholders in order to make them available for
private consumption may come at a tax cost. If private savers and corporations have access to
the same bonds and the same capital market return, then the corporate tax shelter can be5
beneficial even when high taxes on the distribution of corporate dividends apply. Assume that
only a fraction ( θ − 1 ) < 1 of any Euro distributed by the corporations accrues to the owners of
the corporation. This corresponds to a situation in which owners receive only a partial
imputation credit for taxes paid at the corporate level. (In a classical corporate tax system, in
which there is a full double taxation of corporate profits on the corporate and personal level,
θ − 1  would approach  ) 1 ( t −  as the weight of the initial Euro invested in the firm goes to
zero.
6) If we take into account that there is a tax cost to distributions, then this cost will
capitalize in the value of corporate assets W and decrease the path from level a to a fraction
θ − 1  times a.   Notwithstanding this downshift, there is some finite investment period s*,
which makes it worthwhile to invest on path c instead of b. Taking logarithms yields for the
wealth levels on path a, b and c
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Using (1) we can solve for the time s that is required to make Wb larger than Wc. Hence, final
wealth is larger under path b than under c if for  t < τ
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For example, with  1 . 0 , 18 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 3 . 0 = = = = r t θ τ  it takes an investment horizon s of
approximately 10 years to make the use of the corporate shelter worthwhile.
An essential part of determining s* is the cost (implied by a  0 > θ ) to make
accumulated corporate profits available for private consumption. This cost seems to be
particularly high in classical corporate tax systems that imply a high tax on dividend
distributions. But even in classical corporate systems there are ways around the tax penalty on
distributions. 
                                                
6 θ will not exactly match t, since the initial Euro invested in the corporation could be plugged back costlessly. 6
One way to reap cash benefits from a corporation’s accumulated income without
paying the dividend tax is to sell shares to other investors. To close that loophole, many
countries charge a realization based capital gains tax. If raised at the same rate as the dividend
tax rate, there is no tax benefit to shareholder in cashing in sales revenues instead of dividend
income. However, reasons there are plenty why the loophole is all but closed. First, in many
countries (such as Germany) capital gains are exempt if the personal shareholder’s fraction in
the corporation is small enough. In other countries, like in the U.S., capital gains are taxed at a
lower rate or can be evaded in case of a bequest. 
Share repurchases are a similar way to reap cash benefits without paying dividend
taxes.  For example, in the U.S. the fraction of corporate profits that have been distributed as
share repurchases has been estimated to amount to more than 50 percent of dividend payments
in the late 80’s.
7 Like in the case of share sales to other investors, proceeds to personal
investors are subject to capital gains taxes but exempted from ordinary income tax.  
From the above, it is clear that it is all but a straightforward thing to estimate the actual
cost θ as a function of the corporate tax system and the stringency of capital gains taxes. So in
order to derive testable empirical implications, the next section will take a slightly different
approach to the problem. 
3  A Simple Model of Income Shifting
While the above discussion has made clear that the difference in personal and corporate tax
rates plays a role in the allocation of savings between the corporate and non-corporate sectors,
it is helpful to further fix ideas and to develop empirically testable hypotheses before we
proceed to the empirical part of the paper. We do so by setting up a simple model that
incorporates optimizing behavior of firms and personal investors in the face of different tax
rates on different types of income. 
                                                
7 See Bagwell and Shoven (1989). 7
Consider a stylised model of a small open economy where two types of income
shifting may occur. Firstly, domestic households may shift income from savings between the
personal and the corporate base. Secondly, firms may shift income from domestic investment
to other countries. Of course, the existence of these two types of income shifting raises the
question whether taxpayers can shift income directly from the personal sphere to a foreign
corporation, which is located in a low tax country. We rule out this possibility. Note that most
OECD countries have incorporated sections into their national tax codes that from a tax
planning point of view make it difficult or less worthwhile to set up a passive-investment
corporation abroad.
8 Increased international co-operation may add to the problems of using
such vehicles for tax planning of private households. 
The interest rate by assumption is fixed to the international level r.  There is a
representative household who owns an incorporated firm. The household lives for two
periods. In the first period, the household decides on the amount of saving, S, on the fraction
π of S that is held in the private portfolio,  and on the fraction  ) 1 ( π −  that is saved via
domestic corporations. Income earned in the domestic corporation may be shifted to a foreign
subsidiary. The amount of corporate income shifted abroad is denoted by β. 
The effective tax rate on corporate returns is denoted by τ, the tax rate on returns of
privately held portfolios is t and the effective tax rate on foreign corporate income is  * τ .
Allowing for an initial endowment of A, and assuming that both private portfolios and
corporate investment will yield the worldwide pre-tax return r, the household budget
constraint is given by
S A C − = 1
[][] ) ( *) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 2 β γ − β τ − τ + ⋅ π ψ − + τ − + π − + − + π = S T r S t r S C , 
where ) (π ψ  is a strictly convex cost function with a minimum at some  * π : 0 *) ( ' = π ψ . The
function captures possible pros and cons of investing via the corporate sector that lie outside
                                                
8 See Weichenrieder (1996a, 1996b) for an analysis of the so-called Subpart-F type legislation.8
the tax sphere.
9 The function  ) (β γ captures the cost of shifting income to the foreign
subsidiary. Intuitively, the larger the amount of profits shifted, the larger are the necessary
efforts to cover up such behavior.
10 We assume that  ) (π ψ and  ) (β γ are strictly convex. T is the
tax revenue of the government that by assumption is handed back to the household on a per
capita basis: 
τβ − τ π − + π = sr srt T ) 1 (
Merging the two budget constraints into one gives 
[] []
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The household uses the instruments  1 C  and π to maximize  ) , ( 2 1 C C U . The first order
conditions read: 
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At the same time, optimization of the corporation in the best interest of its domestic owner
leads to
(4) {} 0 ' *) (
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Assuming positive marginal utility of second period consumption, we have from condition (3)
that the fraction of savings in the personal portfolio is a function of the difference in the
corporate and personal tax rates:
(5) ⇒ − τ = π ψ ) ( ) ( ' t r   ) ( t − τ π = π . 
                                                
9 See Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994) for empirical estimates of the non-tax cost of incorporating or non-
incorporating.  
10 Since interest rate r is exogenously given, it would be equivalent to include it as an argument in the cost
function. 9
It is worth emphasizing that the optimal share of savings channeled to the private and
corporate sectors is a function of the difference in effective tax rates but it is not a function of
total tax revenues collected by the government. This of course is not to say that tax revenues
are independent of π. The third first order condition in equation (4) implies that the amount
of income shifted to the foreign country is  *) ( τ − τ β = β , with  . 0 ' ' / 1 ' > γ = β
Taken together, the simple model above leads to the intuitive results that the shifting
of income between the personal and the corporate sphere is a function of the difference in
domestic personal and corporate tax rates. This function will be the focus of our empirical
analysis in section 6. 
From equation (4), the income shifting between the domestic and the foreign branches of
a corporation depends on the differences in the domestic and the foreign corporate tax rate.
This type of shifting, as we will consider in greater depth in the next section, has interesting
implications for countries’ tax setting policies.
4  Optimal National Tax Policies in the Face of Income Shifting
Given the reactions of private firms and investors described above, what is the optimal
national tax policy in this framework? In order to facilitate the presentation of the optimal tax
policy analysis, we assume  2 1 2 1 ) ( ) , ( C C g C C U + = , with g’ > 0, g’’ < 0. That is the hous-
hold’s utility is quasi-linear in second period consumption, so that  2 / C U ∂ ∂  is constant. This
assumption implies that we abstract from income effects on the level of savings. The
government maximizes the household’s utility subject to the tax revenue requirement
τβ − τ π − + π = sr srt T ) 1 ( .
The Lagrangean can be written as
(6) ) ) 1 ( ( ) ( ) , , ( 2 1 τβ − τ π − + π η + + = η τ Ω sr srt C C g t
The first order conditions read10
(7) 0 ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( =
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Can a policy of equal corporate and personal income tax rates be optimal? Evaluating the
above first order conditions at  τ = t  and using  ) 1 /( ) / ( / π − π τ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ s t s , which follows from
equation (2), we have
(9) 0 ) 1 ( <
τ ∂
β ∂
ητ − β − η − = Ωτ
Clearly, according to our model a country would not wish to equate personal and corporate tax
rates. The reason is intuitive. While an increase in the domestic corporate tax rate leads to
additional income shifting from the home country to the foreign country, an increase in the
personal income tax rate leads to a shift between domestic tax bases. So the first type of
income shifting is much more costly to the national government. Hence we expect a higher
reluctance to have high corporate tax rates.
11 
5  The Development of Tax Rates: Some Empirical Observations
The theoretical analysis in the preceding section predicts that corporate tax rates – from the
perspective of optimizing governments – should be lower than personal tax rates. It is
important to note that this result has been derived under the assumption that the residence
principle of household taxation can be perfectly enforced and the domestic tax rate on savings,
t, is indeed collected. In reality this is certainly extremely doubtful and, as highlighted in the
introduction, the contrary belief has led to the proposal of detailed EU policies in this area. 
                                                
11 A reduction of the corporate tax below the personal income tax rate may also be an optimal policy in the
presence of asymmetric information in capital markets (see Fuest et al. (2001)). The opportunities of
multinationals to shift income across borders and the consequences of this for international tax competition has
recently been highlighted by Haufler and Schjelderup (2000).11

































































w/o dual income countries
w/ dual income countries12
Annotations: The graph shows two averages over time for two different sets of OECD
countries. The solid line plots the average difference of the corporate tax rate and the personal
tax rate on interest income for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republik
(1993–1997), Germany, France, Spain, Finland, UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and the U.S. The dashed line excludes all those countries that have introduced separate tax rates
for interest income and labor income, i.e., Belgium, Finland, France, Sweden, Italy, Japan, and
Norway. In both cases, the plots are based on a comprehensive measure of CT and TOP,
including typical local and federal surcharges. 
Against the background of the model, a look at the recent history of tax policy changes
in OECD countries is tempting. To analyze these changes, we have tried to measure tax rates
in a comprehensive manner. So unless indicated differently, corporate tax rates in this paper
are for retained earnings and include typical local taxes plus surcharges. Personal tax rates are
rates that apply to interest income and also include local taxes. Based on those comprehensive
rates, the solid line in Figure 2 indicates that on average the difference between personal tax
rates and corporate tax rates has come down and indeed has turned slightly negative. This,
however, is far from being a universal observation. The dashed line excludes countries with
dual income tax systems, which imply a flat rate on interest income. It turns out that most
countries with a progressive taxation of interest income continue to employ a tax rate on
personal income that exceeds the tax on corporate income. 13




















































Cuts in personal 
tax rates
Cuts in corporate 
taxes
Annotations: Figure 3 depicts the changes in personal and corporate taxes from 1985 to 1997. The
solid line shows the percentage point cuts in corporate taxes on retained earnings between 1985 and
1997. The dashed line shows the cuts in the top personal tax rate on interest income. Hence the
difference between the dashed and the solid line shows how the difference between the
comprehensive top marginal income tax rate on interest income (TOP) and the corporate tax rate
(CT) has evolved over time. 14
Figure 3 illustrates the development of the tax rates for 15 OECD countries. The solid line
shows the percentage point cuts in corporate taxes between 1985 and 1997. The dashed line
shows the cuts in the top personal tax rate on interest income. Hence the difference between
the dashed and the solid line shows how the difference between the comprehensive top
marginal income tax rate on interest income (TOP) and the corporate tax rate (CT) has
evolved over time. Canada and Germany have been the only countries that have experienced
an increase in the corporate tax during the period. And all countries but Switzerland have
experienced personal tax cuts that have been more pronounced than corporate tax cuts.
12 
The fact that corporate taxes, by and large, have come down by much less than
personal tax rates on capital income contrasts with the model developed in sections 3 and 4.
This model suggests that a reason for having a CT that undercuts TOP is the international
profit shifting that is induced by high corporate tax rates. If the importance of this
phenomenon has increased, then we should expect that TOP-CT is widening rather than
shrinking. As mentioned above, such a conclusion would overlook, however, that we cannot
readily assume that, during the observed period, the residence-based system of taxing interest
income was perfectly enforced. High income tax rates not only drive savings under the
corporate shelter but also to foreign banks. If this type of tax competition proves even more
severe than the corporate profit-shifting problem, then the empirical observations above are
perfectly reasonable. This does not imply that having a low corporate income tax rate does not
open another interesting loophole for private savers. After all, unlike tax evasion, the use of a
corporate shelter to protect capital income against a high TOP is a perfectly legal thing to do. 
Indeed there is evidence that tax competition has been more severe for TOP than for
CT. One well-known prediction of standard tax competition models (see, e.g., Wellisch 2000
or Kanbur and Keen (1993)) is that smaller countries have a stronger incentive to lower their
tax rates. Evaluated against this background, competition seems to have been much more
effective for personal tax rates than for corporate tax rates. Figure 4 shows the correlation
                                                
12 It should be mentioned that five countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Japan) started out with a
negative difference of TOP-CT in 1985 that still was present in 1997.15
between corporate tax cuts and country size, as measured by the log of 1995 population.
While a negative correlation is present, a linear regression of the decrease in corporate tax
rates on country size is not significant. 



















Annotation: The figure shows the drop in corporate tax rates (measured in percentage points)
between 1985 and 1997. The set of countries includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland,
Germany, Finland, Spain, France, UK, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, and the U.S. 
As indicated by Figure 5, the negative correlation between the cut in top personal tax rates and
country size is much stronger. For our sample of countries a simple linear regression of the
cuts in corporate tax rates on the log of population shows a negative correlation that is
significant at the 5 percent level. 16





















Annotation: The figure shows the cuts in top personal tax rates on interest income
(measured in percentage points) between 1985 and 1997. The set of countries includes
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, UK, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S. 17
6  Empirical Analysis
The theoretical considerations in sections 2 and 3 suggest that we should expect the allocation
of savings between the corporate and non-corporate sector to be driven at least partly by the
difference in the income tax rates in those sectors. In the following we want to empirically
evaluate the size of this effect. 
Since the seminal work of Harberger (1966), tax policy and its influence on the division
of economic activity between the corporate and non-corporate sector have received large
attention in the literature. But empirical analysis on the allocation of assets or savings between
the corporate and the non-cooperative sector as to the best of our knowledge is extremely
sparse and are restricted to U.S. time series. In this vein, Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997)
empirically analyze the post-WWII U.S. time series (1959–1986) for personal tax rates,
corporate tax rates and the distribution of assets between corporations and non-incorporated
firms. They find rather modest tax effects. According to their estimates, a 10 percent increase
in the personal income tax rate leads to an increase in assets in the corporate sector by 0.2
percent. Goolsbee (1998) uses a similar methodology and applies it to historical time series
between 1900 and 1939. The effects of tax changes on asset allocation again turn out to be
statistically significant but small. 
The following analysis differs from those cited in several respects. First, we use a
panel set for 13 OECD countries. Second, instead of taking as an endogenous variable total
assets in the corporate or the non-corporate sector we look at the savings as measured by
national accounts data. Third, unlike existing studies we find sizeable tax effects. 
Data on savings in the corporate and non-corporate sector are available from the National
Accounts of the OECD Statistical Compendium for a subset of OECD countries. As a first
step, we construct the variable PRIVCORP that is defined as the fraction of the share of
corporate savings in total private savings, i.e. the ratio of corporate savings over corporate
plus non-corporate savings. It is a natural candidate to serve as a proxy for (1 – π) in the
model of section 3. Figure 6 shows the development of the variable for 15 OECD countries18
for which we could collect a comprehensive and reliable set of tax rates and for which the
required savings data is available. Excluding Finland and Sweden, the average fraction of
savings that occurs within corporations across time and countries equals 32 percent. As the
graph shows, however, Finland and Sweden show exceptional and not directly plausible
values for PRIVCORP at least for part of the sample period. For Finland the fraction of
savings within corporations ranges from -900 to +700 percent. Similarly, for Sweden the
value of up to 2500 percent for PRIVORP is certainly not linked to tax policy but is due to
some structural break or data problem. We therefore decided to drop these two countries and
did not force the empirical model to explain these extreme outliers. 19
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Non-corporate savings include the savings of unincorporated firms and private
households. Savings of corporations are defined as net-profits minus dividend distributions to
the non-corporate sector.
13 Profit distributions between corporations do not change savings in
the corporate sector as a whole. Note that changes in the structure of corporate finance can
affect the measure of corporate savings. An increase in corporate debt in the form of pension
obligations reduces corporate savings and increases private savings. More generally, a tax
system that favors debt may lead to less profits after taxes and interest and therefore to less
savings within corporations. This contrasts with the studies of U.S. data by Mackie-
Mason/Gordon (1997) and Goolsbee (1998) that consider tax effects on the share of assets
held in corporations, but that do not measure any financing effects. Since we are interested in
tax competition issues, including financing effects indeed is appropriate. Evaluated against the
theoretical tax shifting background developed in the previous chapters, if one effect of a lower
corporate tax rate is that it induces corporations to increase their savings via a reduction of
debt finance, we are certainly interested in this.
14  
Our measure of the difference in personal and corporate tax rates (“DIFF”) relies on
comprehensive rates, including typical local taxes and federal and sub-federal surcharges. For
the personal tax rate we employ the rate for top income receivers. In the case of different rates
on different types of income we use the rate applicable to interest income.
15 Figure 7 gives an
impression of how this difference has involved over time in different countries. Confer to the
appendix for the complete set of tax rates used.
                                                
13 This creates the possibility of negative corporate savings if distributions, which may be financed by past
earnings, exceed net current profits. 
14 Share repurchases, however, do not affect the corporate savings measure. While this is not ideal for our
purposes, it seems to be a cost that has to be paid if national accounts data on savings is used.  
15 Taking the set of countries included in Figure 6 and Figure 7, a different treatment of labor and interest income
applies in Belgium, Finland (since 1993), France, Italy, Japan, Norway (since 1992), and Sweden (since 1991). 22
Table 1: Tax Effects on Corporate Savings
Dependent variable: PRIVCORP
(1) (2)




























Annotation: Estimation based on 13 countries. **/* indicate significance at the 1
and 5 percent level, respectively. Absolute t-values are given in parenthesis. All
significance levels are based on White-corrected standard errors. Individual country
dummies and time specific effects in model (2) are not reported. The hypothesis that
the coefficients for GDPGL1 and GDPGL2 are both zero can be rejected at the one
percent level for model (1) and (2). 
Assuming that investors consider today’s tax rates to decide on their composition of
savings we estimated models that try to explain the fraction of savings in the corporate sector,
PRIVCORP, by the current difference in the top personal tax rates on interest and the
corporate tax rate, DIFF. Additionally we use the growth rate of nominal GDP, GDPG, to
correct for cyclical sensitivity of corporate profits and retentions. Since high growth rates tend
to favor corporate profits, we expect that a high current value of GDPG should lead to high
profits. If distribution of dividends follows corporate profits with some lag, this should
increase corporate retentions and therefore corporate savings. Conversely, if past profits have
been high, this may lead to high distributions today even if current profits are low. This23
suggests that lags of GDPG (GDPGL1, GDPGL2) may have a negative impact on
PRIVCORP.
Table 1 reports our estimation results. Model (1) reports a simple fixed effects model.
The influence of the tax rate differential supports our theoretical model and is significant at
the 5 percent level. According to the estimates, a one percent decrease in the corporate tax rate
increases the fraction of corporate savings in total private savings by 2.6 percentage points. As
expected, the current GDP growth significantly increases the fraction of corporate savings,
and past GDP growth enters negatively. While neither GDPGL1 nor GDPGL2 is significant in
itself, the hypothesis that both coefficients are jointly zero can be rejected at the 1 percent
level. 
Model (2) reproduces model (1) but includes time specific fixed effects to allow for
common shocks across countries. Again the differential between the top personal and the
corporate tax rates significantly influence savings decisions. According to model (2) a one
percent decrease of the corporate tax rate can be expected to increase the fraction of corporate
savings in total private savings by 2.3 percentage points. It should be noted though, that the
time specific effects are not jointly significant. 
7  Concluding Remarks
Our empirical estimates show that corporate savings seem to significantly react to tax
incentives in OECD countries. The estimations in this paper suggest that a one percentage
point increase in the tax rate on private interest income may increase the fraction of saving
performed within corporations by some 2.6 percentage points. Seen from the perspective of
tax competition, a reduction in the corporate tax rates may therefore shift significant amounts
of savings from the household sector to the corporate sector. 
This tax shifting behavior has potentially important implications for the plan to enforce
residence-based taxation of savings through tax co-ordination in the EU. It may well be that
this co-ordination closes the loophole offered by foreign bank accounts – although it is clear24
that tax havens outside the EU will continue to exist. But this type of co-ordination will not
close the corporate tax shelter analysed in this paper. As a reaction to improved enforcement
of residence based taxes on income from savings, our analysis suggests an increase in savings
within the corporate sector.25
8  Bibliography
Altshuler, R., H. Grubert (2000), Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation Strategies and
Multinational Financial Policy, Working paper, Rutgers University (forthcoming in:
Journal of Public Economics).
Alworth, J.S. and L. Castellucci (1993), Tax Reform and the Cost of Capital – An
International Comparision", in D.W. Jorgenson und R. Lanshan (eds.), Brookings,
Washington, 191-243. 
Alworth, J.S., G. Arachi, R. Hamaui, and R. Violi  (2001) The taxation of income from capital
in Italy: 1990-2001, paper presented at the CESifo/FuCam conference on "Capital
taxation in the EU", October 2001.
Bagwell, L.S. and J.B. Shoven (1989), Cash Distributions to Shareholders, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 3, 129-140.
Cnossen, S. (1999), Taxing Capital Income in the Nordic Countries: A Model for the
European Union?, Finanzarchiv 56, 18–50.
Fuest, C., B. Huber and S.B. Nielsen (2001), Why is the Corporate Tax Rate Lower than the
Personal Tax Rate? The Role of Small Firms, forthcoming in: Journal of Public
Economics.
Goldsbee, A. (1998), Taxes, Organizational Form, and the Deadweight Loss of the Corporate
Income Tax, Journal of Public Economics 69, 143-152. 
Gordon, R. H. (1998), Can High Personal Tax Rates Encourage Entrepreneurial Activity?
IMF Staff Papers 45, 49-80.
Gordon, R.H.  and J. Slemrod (1998), Are “real“ Responses to Taxes Simply Income Shifting
between Corporate and Personal Tax Bases? NBER Working Paper No. 6576.
Gordon, R.H. and J.K. MacKie-Mason (1994), Tax Distortions to the Choice of
Organizational Form, Journal of Public Economics 55, 279-306. 
Gordon, R.H. and J.K. MacKie-Mason (1994), “Why is there Corporate Income Taxation in a
Small Open Economy? The Role of Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting,” in M.
Feldstein and J. Hines (eds.), Issues in International Taxation. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 67-91. 
Kanbur, R. und M. Keen (1993), Jeux sans fontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination
when Countries Differ in Size, American Economic Review 83, 877-892.
Harberger, A. (1966), Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital, in M. Kryzaniak
(ed.) Effects of Corporation Income Tax, Detroit, 107-117. 
Haufler, A. and G. Schjelderup (2000), Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit
Shifting, Oxford Economic Papers 52, 306-325.
Kanbur, R. and M. Keen (1993), Jeux sans Fontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination
when Countries Differ in Size, American Economic Review 83, 877-892.
Keen, M. (1993). The Welfare Economics of Tax Co-ordination in the European Community:
A Survey. Fiscal Studies 14, 15-36.
MacKie-Mason, J.K. and R. H. Gordon (1997), How Much do Taxes Discourage
Incorporation?, Journal of Finance 52,477-505.
Messere, K. (1999), Half a Century of Changes in Taxation, Bulletin of International Fiscal
Documentation 8-9/1999, 340-365.26
Messere, K. (2000), 20th Century Taxes and their Future, Bulletin for International Fiscal
Documentation 1/2000, 2-29.
Mintz, J. (1995), The Corporate Income Tax: A Survey, Fiscal Studies 16, 23-68.
Price Waterhouse (1992), Individual Taxes: A Worldwide Summery.
Weichenrieder, A.J. (1995), Besteuerung und Direktinvestition. Tübingen, Mohr. 
Weichenrieder, A.J. (1996a), Fighting International Tax Avoidance: The Case of Germany,
Fiscal Studies 17, 37-58. 
Weichenrieder, A.J. (1996b), Anti-Tax-Avoidance Provisions and the Size of Foreign Direct
Investment, International Tax and Public Finance 3, 67-81. 
Wellisch, D. (2000), Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press. 27
9  Appendix
Table 2: Personal Top Rates on Interest Income (in Percent)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Australia 60 57 49 49 48 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Belgium 25 25 25 25 25 10 10 10 10.3 13.39 13.39 15 15
Canada (Ontario) 50.3 50.3 50.3 45 43.5 43.5 46.4 46.4 46.4 52.9 49.5 48.1 48.4
Finland 71.99 71.82 71.95 72.11 64.94 64.01 61.15 63.9 25 25 25 28 28
France 26 26 27 27 27 17 18.1 18.1 18.1 19.4 19.9 20.9 25
Germany
a 56 56 56 56 56 53 54.99 54.99 53.00 53 56.98 56.98 56.98
Italy
b 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Japan 35 35 35 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Netherlands 72 72 72 72 72 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Norway 66.9 66.4 56 48 45.6 43 40.5 28 28 28 28 28 28
Spain 66 66 66 56 56 56 56 53 56 56 56 56 56
Sweden 75 76.65 73.15 71.15 68.7 61.7 30 30 30 28 28 28 28
Switzerland (Zurich) 44.1 42.4 42.4 40.9 40.9 40.9 40.9 40.9 40.9 44 45.4 42.2 42.2
UK 60 60 60 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
USA (New York) 58.8 58.8 50.8 36.6 36.6 36.6 36.2 36.2 36.2 46.2 47.1 47.1 46.45
Sources: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, Zahlen zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, various issues; Messere (1999/2000); Alworth and Castellucci (1993); Alworth et.al.
(2001); Price Waterhouse (1992), several communications with national ministries and international scholars; Office of Tax Policy Research, Michigan, OTPR-data base;
several internet sources.
Annotations: 
a Includes solidarity surcharge.  
b Typical rate applied to savings accounts. A lower rate is available for government bonds. 28
Table 3: Corporate Tax Rates on Retained Earnings (in Percent)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Australia 46 49 49 49 39 39 39 39 39 33 36 36 36
Belgium 45 45 43 43 43 41 39 39 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 40.17
Canada (Ontario) 50 50 50 38 42 43.5 44.3 44.3 44.3 45.1 44.6 44.6 44.6
Finland 60.24 50.32 50.45 50.61 50.69 42.76 40.9 37.15 25 25 25 28 28
France 50 45 45 42 39 37 34 34 33.33 33.33 33.33 36.7 41.7
Germany
a 62.65 62.70 62.70 62.74 62.74 57.70 59.29 59.39 57.84 53.68 56.58 56.71 56.78
Italy 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 47.8 47.8 47.8 52.2 52.2 52.2 37
Japan 52.3 52.3 52.3 50.7 48.3 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44.6
Korea 20 30 30 30 30 30 34 34 34 32 30 28 28
Netherlands 43 42 42 42 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Norway 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.1 28 28 28 28 28 28
Portugal 42 42 42 42 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Spain 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Sweden 52.4 52 52 52 52 40 30 30 30 30 28 28 28
Switzerland (Zurich) 34.9 33.6 33.6 30.2 30.2 30.2 34.3 34.3 34.3 34.3 35.6 35.6 35.6
UK 45 35 35 35 35 35 33 33 33 33 33 33 31
USA (New York) 58.8 58.8 51.4 39.9 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 48.4 46.4
Sources: See Table 2.
Annotations: 
a Includes solidarity surcharge and Gewerbesteuer (trade tax) at average local rate (Hebesteuersatz).  CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
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